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Native American Bank 
The Fallon Paiute Tribe in Fernly, Nevada, had heard many reasons why banks could not 
provide a loan to buy back ancestral land. Tired of constant turndowns and delays, the 
tribe applied to the Native American Bank, NA. NAB not only understood the historical 
importance of the buyback, but also saw the economic opportunity that other banks 
had missed. After underwriting and credit approval, the Fallon Paiute closed on an NAB 
loan in July 2007. It was a win-win: The tribe obtained access to much-needed capital, 
and NAB added an earning asset to its balance sheet. 
Being turned down by banks is a familiar story for many American Indian communities. 
Although the advent of gaming has brought wealth to a small subset of tribes, American 
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Indians remain at the bottom of most social statistics. The 2000 U.S. census showed the 
per capita income for on-reservation citizens to be $7,942, much lower than the $21,587 
U.S. average.1  Poverty rates by ethnicity showed American Indians and Alaska’s on-reser-
vation natives at 39 percent, compared with poverty rates of 9 percent for whites. 
Although the overall reality is discouraging, positive trends are emerging. For example, 
reservations’ $7,942 per capita income in 2000 was 33 percent greater than the $5,929 
figure from 1990, whereas income growth for the U.S. population as a whole was only 4 
percent.2  (Interestingly, the American Indian per capita growth was the same on non-
gaming and gaming reservations.3)
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From top: battered women’s shelter on a reservation in South Dakota, financed by NAB; 
Native American entrepreneurs in Colorado opening a franchise of the Rocky Mountain 
Chocolate Factory; house built with NAB funding on the Blackfoot Reservation in  
Browning, Montana; Eastern Shoshone Tribe signs off on financing for a new water  
treatment plant in Wyoming. Photographs: Native American Bank
Urgent Need  
for Capital
In  the  past,  many  U.S.   
Indian programs that were 
aimed  at  alleviating  pov-
erty  were  short-term  and 
did little for communities’   
economic  growth.  Some 
programs,  such  as  drug 
abuse  prevention,  were   
notorious  for  federal  cuts 
that left participants in the 
middle  of  project  mile-
stones.  It  wasn’t  until  the 
mid-1970s,  when  a  new 
law  gave  the  tribes  over-
sight of most federal Indian   
programs,  that  there  was 
a  shift  toward  sustainable   
economic development.4 
For  tribes  trying  to 
access  financial  services, 
there have been other chal-
lenges,  often  the  result  of 
institutions’  inadequate 
understanding  of  Indian 
Country.  During  the 
planning  phase  of  Native 
American  Bank,  tribal 
representatives  frequently 
mentioned  that  tribal 
deposits  in  financial  insti-
tutions did not seem to be 
coming  back  to  their  res-
ervations  through  lending 
or  other  financial  services. 
Certainly, poverty played a 
role in the dearth of lend-
ing.  Nevertheless,  leaders 
maintained  that  banks’ 
insistence  on  cash-secured 
loans made no sense, given 
that lack of cash was gen-
erally  the  reason  tribes 
were  trying  to  access  debt   
markets in the first place.
Financial  institutions 
cited their own reasons for 
the  lack  of  lending.  The 
trust status of land bars a lending institu-
tion  from  seizing  property  in  the  event 
of  a  default,  so  one  secondary  source  of 
repayment is not the option that it is off-
reservation. Lending institutions also feared 
that tribes would claim sovereign immunity 
if a repayment dispute landed in court. As 
a result, many bankable transactions were 
never consummated. Tribes refused to waive 
their immunity; banks refused to advance 
money until such agreement was reached. 
NAB’s  founders  realized  that  many 
problems flowed from misunderstandings. 
For  example,  a  waiver  of  immunity  was 
indeed  necessary  if  federally  recognized 
tribes were the direct borrowers or guaran-
tors, but some banks incorrectly assumed 
that  it  also  applied  to  nontribal  entities 
operating on Indian land. The founders saw 
those misunderstandings as an opportunity. 
They knew that plain-vanilla banking could 
work in Indian Country, and they wanted 
to  prove  it  to  tribes  and  to  the  world.   
They believed the ingredients just needed 
to be adjusted slightly to a flavor palatable 
to Indians. 
Creating a National Bank 
There  are  nine  American  Indian  banks   
today. The  Native  American  Bank  is  the 
only one that is owned by multiple tribes 
and nationally focused. 
In  2001,  21  tribal  investors  put 
together  more  than  $11  million  to  capi-
talize  Native  American  Bancorporation, 
NAB’s parent company. The investors var-
ied from relatively poor tribes in the rural 
Rocky Mountains (Blackfeet and Chippewa 
Cree tribes) to the largest tribe in America, 
the Navajos in the Southwest. Connecticut’s 
Mashantucket  Pequot  Tribal  Nation  was 
also  a  founding  investor,  and  the  New 
England-based Mohegan tribe was a minor 
founding  shareholder.  Backed  by  the   
$11  million,  NAB  purchased  what  had 
been the first tribal bank, founded in 1987.   
That  was  Blackfeet  National  Bank  of 
Browning, Montana. 
 Communities & Banking    23
To  tackle  the  lending  issues,  Native 
American Bank first had to secure govern-
ment guarantees from the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, the Small Business 
Administration, and the U.S. Department 
of Transportation. But the founders knew 
that the growth of the balance sheet would 
have  more  to  do  with  understanding  the 
who, what, where, and how of tribal eco-
nomic development. So NAB hired people 
who either had grown up in Indian Country 
or had significant ties to it—people with   
a  knack  for  tribal  policy  and  history.   
The idea was that a staff with deep under-
standing of trust land, tribal court systems, 
and the like would offer a distinct competi-
tive advantage.
The next challenge was to fund loan 
growth. Given that NAB was serving his-
torically cash-strapped and cash-dependent 
communities,  deposits  lagged  behind 
loan  demand.  Like  other  small  and  mid-
size banks, NAB at first found it difficult 
to cover asset growth with core deposits.5 
American depositors in general had become 
interest-rate sensitive and were putting only 
13 percent of household financial assets into 
banks’ core deposits in 2000 (as opposed to 
31 percent in 1985).6  
Lack  of  deposits  drove  up  the  cost 
of  capital  for  NAB,  so  employees  began 
reaching out to large foundations and cor-
porations, explaining that Native American 
Bank deposits were insured by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, had com-
petitive interest rates, and could yield both 
financial and social returns—a double bot-
tom line.7 The social reward was knowing 
that deposits were being lent to communi-
ties that needed access to capital the most. 
The  outreach  effort  garnered  significant 
results, including a $1 million deposit from 
the  Microsoft  Corporation  in  2004.  (See 
“Native American Bank, Total Assets.”)
Although,  like  most  de  novo  banks, 
NAB  was  unprofitable  at  first,  it  cleared 
$516,000 in 2006. In 2007 it more than 
doubled that performance with over $1.4 
million in net income. Return on average 
assets, a common met-
ric for measuring bank 
performance,  was  a 
respectable  1.40  per-
cent  that  year.8  (See 
“Native  American 
Bank, Net Income.”)
Located  near 
Denver  International 
Airport  for  accessibil-
ity,  NAB  is  currently 
providing  capital  to 
Indian communities in 
the northernmost parts 
of  Alaska,  the  plains 
of  North  Dakota, 
communities  in  New 
England, and more. As 
it  continues  be  prof-
itable  and  to  attract 
investors,  it  expects 
to  increase  its  physi-
cal footprint in Indian 
Country.  The  success 
of the Native American 
Bank is one more proof 
that Indians themselves 
are  the  people  best 
suited  to  refortifying 
Indian communities. 
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Endnotes
1Jonathan  B. Taylor  and  Joseph  P.  Kalt,  American 
Indians on Reservations: A Databook of Socioeconomic 
Change between the 1990 and 2000 Censuses (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Project on American 
Indian Economic Development, January 2005). 
2Real numbers, adjusted for inflation. 
3See  http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/pubs/ 
documents/AmericanIndiansonReservationsA 
DatabookofSocioeconomicChange.pdf.
4See PL 93-638 of the Indian Self-Determination and 
Educational Assistance Act. 
5Deposits (including small-denomination time depos-
its, savings, and checking accounts) that are acquired in 
a bank’s natural market area count as a stable source of 
funds for lending because they have a predictable cost, 
imply a degree of customer loyalty, and are less interest-
rate sensitive than short-term certificates of deposit and 
money market deposit accounts. 
6James Harvey and Kenneth Spong, The Decline in 
Core Deposits: What Can Banks Do? (Kansas City: Kan-
sas City Federal Reserve, 2001).
7With the advent of the Certificate of Deposit Ac-
count Registry Services (CDARS) program, NAB can 
offer FDIC Insurance on CDs up to $50 million under 
unique tax IDs. 
8From  NAB’s  Uniform  Bank  Performance  Report, 








Native American Bank, Total Assets
2002-2007
2002 2003 2005 2007 2004 2006
assets
Native American Bank, Net Income
2002-2007








This Communities & Banking article is copyrighted 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The views 
expressed are not necessarily those of the Bank or 
the Federal Reserve System. Copies of articles may 
be  downloaded  without  cost  at  www.bos.frb.org/
commdev/c&b/index.htm.